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ABSTRACT
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) and its variants serve as a perfect representation of the
data generation model, providing researchers with a large amount of high-quality generated data.
They illustrate a promising direction for research with limited data availability. When GAN learns
the semantic-rich data distribution from a dataset, the density of the generated distribution tends to
concentrate on the training data. Due to the gradient parameters of the deep neural network contain the
data distribution of the training samples, they can easily remember the training samples. When GAN
is applied to private or sensitive data, for instance, patient medical records, as private information may
be leakage. To address this issue, we propose a Privacy-preserving Generative Adversarial Network
(PPGAN) model, in which we achieve differential privacy in GANs by adding well-designed noise to
the gradient during the model learning procedure. Besides, we introduced the Moments Accountant
strategy in the PPGAN training process to improve the stability and compatibility of the model by
controlling privacy loss. We also give a mathematical proof of the differential privacy discriminator.
Through extensive case studies of the benchmark datasets, we demonstrate that PPGAN can generate
high-quality synthetic data while retaining the required data available under a reasonable privacy
budget.
Keywords Privacy leakage · GAN · deep learning · differential privacy · moments accountant
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers have used a large number of training data to perform data mining tasks, in the field of
medical and health informatics, such as disease prediction and auxiliary diagnosis [1]. Deep learning models are
employed to remember the characteristics of a large number of training samples for classification or prediction purposes.
However, organizations such as hospitals and research institutes are paying more and more attention to the protection
of data. Additionally, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[2] issued by the European Union prohibits
organizations from sharing private data. It is increasingly difficult for researchers to obtain training data unlimited
legally.
Fortunately, the generative model provides us with a solution to the issue of data scarcity [3], yet data privacy leakage
issues may arise. StyleGAN [4] shown impressive performance in generating fake face images. In principle, it can
∗*Corresponding Author: Pengjialiang@hlju.edu.cn. This work is supported by the Ministry of Education of China and the
School of Entrepreneurship Education of Heilongjiang University (Grant NO.201910212133) and Heilongjiang Provincial Natural
Science Foundation of China (Grant NO.QC2016091).
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memorize data distribution from the small amount of training data, rendering indistinguishable high-quality “fake"
samples. However, for most people, they expect their face data not to be used as a training sample.
GAN can implicitly disclose the privacy information of training samples. GAN model produces high-quality "fake"
samples through continuous training and resampling. This training method grants hackers the opportunity to restore the
original samples. Therefore, we not only need high-quality sample generation approaches but also need to achieve a
reasonable level of data privacy.
Based on the above findings, we propose a Privacy-preserving GAN (PPGAN). PPGAN combines with differential
privacy [5] to ensure that the exact training samples can not be revealed by adversaries from the trained model, resulting
in well-protected data privacy. In particular, we added well-designed noise to the gradients in the training process in
PPGAN and used the framework of the WGAN [6] model as the main skeleton of PPGAN. The proposed model does
not suffer from a privacy leakage issue whose proportional to the volume of data thanks to the introduced average
aggregator that offsets the privacy overhead of large datasets.
We would like to point out our main contributions as follows:
• We propose the PPGAN framework that can generate high-quality data points while protecting data privacy.
PPGAN combines noise well-designed in the differential privacy with training gradients to disturb the
distribution of the original data. Finally, we give a rigorous proof of the differential privacy discriminator in
mathematics.
• We introduced the Moments Accountant strategy that maintains the boundedness of the function, controls the
privacy level and significantly improves the stability of the model training.
• We evaluated PPGAN with benchmark datasets. The results show that PPGAN can generate high-quality data
with adequately protected privacy under a reasonable privacy budget.
The overall structure of this paper is as follows. First, we briefly summarize the relevant literature in Section 2 and then
introduce the proposed PPGAN framework and its theoretical proof in Section 3. We assess the performance of our
framework in Section 4. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we focus on the literature on privacy-preserving deep learning. Existing literature can be roughly
classified along several axes: generative adversarial networks in the medical field and privacy-preserving deep learning.
Generative Adversarial Network. In recent years, GAN and its variants have made meaningful progress in the
academic and medical fields. Choi et al. [7] proposed medGAN, which is a generative adversarial network for
generating multi-label discrete patient records. Brett K. Beaulieu-Jones et al. [8] proposed AC-GAN (under differential
privacy and labeled private) to simulate participants in the SPRINT clinical trial. However, the previously described
GANs do not meet the data management requirements of GDPR for privacy data protection.
Privacy-Preserving Deep Learning. Differential privacy (DP), local differential privacy (LDP), and other related
algorithms combined with deep neural networks have become one of the most popular algorithmic models in the
field of privacy protection. Dwork et al. [9], the author of the concept of differential privacy, laid a lot of theoretical
foundations for the field of differential privacy. Song et al. [10] added perturbations to random descent gradients, which
can improve network performance after batch training. Many machine learning algorithms can achieve differential
private by introducing randomization in the calculation, usually by noise [10].
We propose PPGAN to address the challenges that appeared in the previous works. In [11], although the privacy-
preserving deep learning system does not need to share datasets, it still reveals the user’s privacy when uploading local
parameters to the server. What is different from [12] is that we add well-designed noise during the process of stochastic
gradient descent. We introduced a moments accountant strategy, which not only successfully incorporated the privacy
enhancement mechanism into the training depth generation model but also significantly improved the stability and
scalability of the generation model training itself [13].
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we elaborate on the proposed privacy protection framework PPGAN. We first introduce the concept of
differential privacy. Subsequently, a brief introduction to GAN and WGAN. After that, we show the proposed PPGAN
with theoretical analyses and the way noise is added to the gradients. Finally, we introduce moments accountant [14],
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which is the fundamental idea in our framework to ensure the privacy of the iterative gradient descent process. We
strictly prove in mathematics that the use of the moments accountant allows the discriminator to guarantee differential
privacy.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [9, 5, 14] constitutes a solid standard for privacy guarantee for algorithms on the database.
For all two datasets x and y, which differ by at most one record, we refer to these two datasets as a neighboring dataset.
In the above description, natural measure of the distance between two databases x and y will be their distance:
Definition 1 (Distance Between Databases)
The `1 norm of a database x is denoted ||x||1 and is defined to be:
||x||1 =
|ℵ|∑
i=1
|xi| (1)
The `1 distance between two databases x and y is ||x− y||1. In particular, when ||x− y||1 = 1, x and y are mutually
referred to as neighboring datasets.
Definition 2 ((ε, δ)-DP)
A randomized algorithm φ(·) with domain Φ|χ| is (ε, δ)-DP if for all O ⊆ Range(φ) and for all d, d′ ∈ Φ|ℵ| (for any
neighbouring datasets) such that ||d− d′|| ≤ 1 :
Pr[φ(d) ∈ O] ≤ eεPr[φ(d′) ∈ O] + δ (2)
Noted that  stands for privacy budget, which controls the level of privacy guarantee achieved by mechanism φ. And
when ε =∞, this case is non-private.
Among the mechanisms for achieving differential privacy, the two most widely used are the Laplace mechanism and
the Gaussian noise mechanism (GNM) [15]. Due to the combined properties of the GNM, it is prevalent in many DP
protection models. In PPGAN, we use the GNM because the moments accountant (detailed in Section 3.4) provides an
improved privacy boundary analysis and is well-matched to the combined properties of the GNM. The GNM is defined
as follows:
φ(x)
∆
= f(x) +N(0, σ2sf
2) (3)
where sf is defined as sensitivity, which is only related to query type f . The sensitivity is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (L2 norm-Sensitivity)
We given the neighboring datasets x and x′ and given a query f : x→ Ω, the sensitivity of f as follows:
∆f = max
x,x′
||f(x)− f(x′)||2 (4)
Noted that it records the largest difference between query results on datasets x and x′.
According to the algorithm φ(·) in Definition 2 is stochastic and is not related to the distribution of the output data.
Moreover, the Gaussian noise mechanism adds a well-design noise to a single gradient without affecting the entire
gradient aggregation. Therefore, we can use this attribute with GAN so that GAN can generate high-quality data while
satisfying differential privacy.
3.2 GAN and WGAN
Generative adversarial network (GAN) [16, 17] is a class of deep neural network architectures comprised of two
networks, pitting one against the other (thus the “adversarial"). Suppose our generative model is G(z), where z is
random noise and G converts this random noise into x. Take with contradicting training adjective Electronic Health
Record (EHR) as an example. Let G be a generator synthesizing EHR, and D is the discriminator in the generator
model. For an arbitrary input x, the output of D(x) is a real number in the range [0,1] that determines how likely
this EHR is authentic. Let Pr and Pg represent the distribution of real ones and the distribution of generated EHRs,
respectively. The objective function of the discriminative model is as follows:
max
D
Ex∼Pr[log(D(x)] + Ex∼Pg[log(1−D(x)] (5)
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The goal of a similar from distinguishing is to prevent them from real records and the generated ones. The entire
optimization objective function is as follows:
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = Ex∼Pdata (x)[log(D(x)]
+ Ez∼Pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(6)
WGAN [6] uses the Wasserstein distance instead of the Jensen-Shannon distance. Compared with the original GAN,
WGAN’s parameters are less sensitive and the training process is smoother. It solves a minimax two-player game that
finds the balance point of each other:
min
G
max
w∈W
Ex∼Pdata(x)[fw(x)]− Ez∼Pz(z) [fw(G(z))] (7)
3.3 PPGAN framework
In this section, we present the proposed Privacy-preserving Generative Adversarial Network (PPGAN) model, which
is detailed in Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Fig. 1. Noted that the Discriminator has access to the real data, while
the Generator only receives feedback on the real data through the Discriminator’s output. This will be useful in
PPGAN since only the Discriminator is required to differential privacy. The Generator’s utilizes the result from the
Discriminator, thus differential privacy [18]. (So we add noise proportional to the training data on the gradient of the
Wasserstein distance, rather than adding noise to the final parameters.)
noise
Generator
g
Real 
Samples
DPDM
Discriminator
Is D Correct?
Noisy
Back-propagation
DP noise
Latent 
Space
Add noise on
gradients
Discriminator
Loss
Figure 1: Overview of our Privacy-preserving Generative Adversarial Network (PPGAN) framework.
3.4 Privacy Guarantees of PPGAN
To show that PPGAN in Algorithm 1 does satisfy the differential privacy, we prove that the parameters of the generator
guarantee the differential privacy relative to the sample training point under the condition that the discriminator
parameters satisfy the differential privacy. Therefore, the generated data from G satisfies the differential privacy, which
means that G does not leakage the privacy of the dataset [19]. Through moment accountant strategy, we can control
the boundary of gw(x(i), z(i)) and calculate the final privacy loss. Along with Definition 2, intuitively, we have the
definition of privacy loss at τ :
Definition 4 (Privacy Loss)
c(τ ;φ, aux, d, d′) ∆= log
P[φ(aux, d) = τ ]
P[φ(aux, d′) = τ ]
(8)
We introduce privacy loss to measure the distribution difference between two changing data. The privacy loss random
variable is derived from the Definition 2, which is used to describe the privacy budget of φ(d). For a given mechanism
φ, we define the υth moment βφ(υ; aux, d, d′) as the log of the moment generating function evaluated at the value:
4
A PREPRINT - OCTOBER 7, 2019
Algorithm 1 Privacy-preserving Generative Adversarial Network (PPGAN)
Require:
The learning rate: α. The clipping parameter: c. The mini-batch size: m. The number of discriminator iterations
per generator iteration: nd. Generator iteration: ng . Noise scale: σn.
Ensure:
DP generator θ;
1: Initialize generator parameters and discriminator parameters ω0, θ0, respectively.
2: for t1 = 1, ..., ng do
3: for t2 = 1, ..., nd do
4: {x(i)}mi=1 ∼ PΥ a mini-batch from the real data.
5: {z(i)}mi=1 ∼ p(z) a mini-batch of prior samples.
6: gω ← gω min(1, C/||gω||) +N(0, σn2c2gI) (adding noise)
7: ω ← clip(ω + α · SGD(ω, gω),−c, c)
8: end for
9: gδ ← gδ min(1, C/||gδ||)
10: θ ← θ − α · SGD(θ, gθ)
11: end for
12: return θ;
Definition 5 (Log moment generating function)
βφ(υ; aux, d, d
′) ∆= logEo∼φ[eυC(φ,aux,d,d
′)] (9)
Definition 6 (Moments Accountant)
βφ(υ)
∆
= max
aux,d,d′
βφ(υ; aux, d, d
′) (10)
The basic idea behind the moments accountant is to accumulate the privacy expenditure by framing the privacy loss as
a random variable and using its moment-generating functions to understand that variable’s distribution better. This
property makes the PPGAN model training more stable [20]. The tail bound can also be applied to privacy guarantee
(In [14]). Since the moments accountant saves a factor of
√
log(ng/δ), according to Definition 2, this is a significant
improvement for the large iteration ng .
The following theorem, a proof of which can be found in [3, 14, 21, 22], allows us to move the burden of differential
privacy to the discriminator; the differential privacy of the generator will follow by the theorem.
Theorem 1 (Post-processing)
Let φ be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm and let f : ξ → ξ′ where ξ′ is any arbitrary space. Then f ◦ φ meets
(ε, δ)-differentially private.
Next, we present the mathematical reasoning proof that the discriminator satisfies the differential privacy. First, we
propose a lemma that PPGAN satisfies the definition of DP.
Lemma 1 Under the definition of GNM and L2-sensitivity (in Definition 3), for any δ ∈ (0, 1), σ >
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)∆f
ε ,
we have noise Y ∼ N(0, σ2) satisfies (ε, δ)-DP.
Proof 1 We assume that ∆f is the L2-sensitivity, and according to the Definition. 2, then we have:
| ln e
− 1
2σ2
x2
e−
1
2σ2
(x+∆f)2
| = | 1
2σ2
(2x∆f + (∆f)2)| ≤ ε ∴ |x| ≤ σ
2ε
∆f
− ∆f
2
∆f. (11)
Let t = σ
2ε
∆f − ∆f2 , if and only if ||x|| ≤ t, the distribution satisfies DP, and when ||x|| > t, we want the probability of
privacy leakage to be less than δ, so we have:
P (x > t) <
δ
2
(12)
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where P (·) denotes the probability of revealing privacy. Next, we prove that the Gaussian distribution function is
bounded above:
P (x > t) =
1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
t
e−
x2
2σ2 dx <
1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
t
x
t
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
=
σ√
2pit
e−
t2
2σ2 (∵ x > t)
(13)
Then the problem is converted to:
σ√
2pit
e−
t2
2σ2 <
δ
2
,
t
σ
e
t2
2σ2 >
2√
2piσ
, ln
t
σ
+
t2
2σ2
> ln
2√
2piσ
(14)
∴

ln
t
σ
> 0
t2
2σ2
> ln
2√
2piδ
(15)
For the left two terms of Equation 15, because t = σ
2ε
∆f − ∆f2 , let σ = c∆fε , then t = cσ − ∆f2 , thus we have:
t
σ
= c− ∆f
2σ
= c− ε
2c
. (16)
Here ε < 1, c > 1, then
ln(c− ε
2c
) > ln(c− 1
2
) > 0. (17)
By Equation 17, we have c > 32 . By Equation 16, we have:
t2
2σ2
=
1
2
(c2 − ε+ ε
2
4c2
). (18)
Because ε < 1, c > 32 , we have:
c2 − ε+ ε
2
4c2
> c2 − 8
9
> 2 ln
1√
2piδ
(19)
c2 > ln
2
pi
e
8
9 + 2 ln
1
δ
,∵ ln 2
pi
e
8
9 > 1.252,∴ c2 > 2 ln 1.25
δ
(20)
In the above equations, let σ = c∆fε , so we have σ >
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)∆f
ε . In particular, in the SGD algorithm, Gaussian
noise meets the definition of satisfying differential privacy as long as it satisfies σ > c q
√
T ln( 1δ )
ε , where q is the sampling
probability and T is the iteration round.
According to [3], the conditions for the discriminator to guarantee differential privacy are given as follows:
σn = 2q
√
nd log(
1
δ
)/ε (21)
where q is the sampling probability and nd is the number of iterations of the discriminator in each loop.
Theorem 2 Equation21 represents the relationship between the noise level σn and the privacy level . When we give a
fixed perturbation σn on the gradient, according to Equation21, we know that the larger the q is, the D gets the fewer
privacy guarantee. Because the D calculates more data, the privacy that can be allocated on each data point is limited.
In addition, due to the data provides more information, more iterations (nd) will result in fewer privacy guarantees.
The facts described above require us to be cautious when choosing parameters to achieve a reasonable level of privacy.
PPGAN modifies the GAN framework to keep differentially private while relying on Theorem 1,2 and Lemma 1 to
change the differential private G to train the differentially private D.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will conduct a series of experiments to investigate how the privacy budget affects the effectiveness
of PPGAN on the two benchmark datasets MNIST and MIMIC-III [23]. MIMIC-III is a well-known public EHR
database that includes medical records of 46,520 intensive care units (ICUs) over the age of 11 [3]. We employ PPGAN
to generate EHRs and protected privacy information at the same time. In the experiment, we focus on two issues:
1) Relationship between Privacy budget and Generation Performance; 2) Relationship between Privacy budget and
High-quality Datasets.
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4.1 Data preprocessing
First, we only use the extracted ICD9 code (The ICD9 code represents the type of disease, and the range of coding
is C ∈ [1, 1071].) [24, 25] and use the first three digits for encoding. We then record the patient’s admission to the
disease and turn it into a vector x. For example, patient P was diagnosed with three diseases at admission, and the
disease codes are indicated by 9, 42, 146, respectively. (So the ICD9 code consists of 9, 42 and 146.) We use the vector
x to indicate the patient’s access record, where the vector is at position 9, the 42nd and 146th bits are set to 1, and the
rest are set to 0. Then we aggregate the patient’s longitudinal record into a single fixed-size vector x ∈ Z+, where
|C| = 1071 for dataset.
4.2 Relationship between Privacy budget and Generation Performance
In this section, we mainly explore the relationship between privacy budget and generation performance. Considering
the combined properties data of Gaussian noise, we add Gaussian noise in the process of stochastic gradient
descent. Different Gaussian noises can produce different levels of privacy. We input the same set of MNIST image
datasets and observe the output generated samples. In the experiments, αd = 5.0× 10−5 learning rate of discriminator;
αg = 5.0×10−5, learning rate of generator; moments accountant parameterC = 1.0×10−2; noise scale δ = 1.0×10−5,
and the number of iterations on discriminator td and generator tg are 5 and 5.0× 105, respectively. The experimental
results are shown in Fig. 2. The code is available.2
As shown in Fig. 2, as the privacy budget increases, the quality of the generated images is getting worse. We add
well-designed noise that disturbs the data point distribution of the image. Since the noise is randomly added, the
distribution of disturbing data points is not fixed, thus ensuring differential privacy.
 =  20 = 10 = 5 =
Figure 2: Four different  values are generated for four different quality pictures on MNIST dataset.(ε = ∞, ε =
20, ε = 10, ε = 5; δ = 1.0× 10−5)
Next, we will focus on the impact of noise on PPGAN’s loss function during training. The results are shown in Fig. 3
In the non-private case, we observe the training loss of the first 100 epoch in training. The result indicates that the loss
of GAN is smooth and stable, and no large fluctuations exist in this round of training. When the loss of the PPGAN
with noise starts to fluctuate at the tail of the curve, PPGAN can still converge. As can be inspected from Fig. 3, the
convergence rate of PPGAN is acceptable as the compromise of the introduced privacy preservation capability.
4.3 Relationship between Privacy budget and High-quality Datasets
In this section, we quantitatively evaluate the performance of PPGAN. Specifically, we first compare generated data
with real data based on statistical characteristics. We propose a Generate score to measure the quality of data generated
by GAN. We proposed Generate score (GS(Pg)) to measure the quality of data generated by PPGAN, which can be
formally defined as follows for Pg:
Definition 7 (Generate scores):
IS(Pg) = e
Ex∼Pg [KL(PM(y|x)||PM(y))]
GS(Pg) = | IS(Pg)−mean(IS(Pg))max(IS(Pg))−min(IS(Pg)) |
(22)
2https://github.com/hdliuyi/PPGANs-Privacy-preserving-GANs
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Non-private Case Private Case
Figure 3: Loss of Non-private Case (ε =∞) and Private Case (ε 6=∞).
where IS(Pg) is Inception score which is measure of the performance of the GAN.
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Figure 4: Generate scores of generative data on MNIST.
The experimental result is shown in Fig. 4. The generated data’s (generated by PPGAN) generate score is compared to
the real data of the MNIST dataset with different privacy budgets. The larger the score value, the better the quality of
the data generated by the generator. The figure shows the distribution of the generate scores of PPGAN in the case
of  = 20, 10, 5. It can be seen from the figure that the score is very close to the real data generated by the WGAN
(non-private case, ε =∞.). When  = 20, the PPGAN generate score is only 0.14 different from the WGAN generate
score, which indicates that the PPGAN generation quality is close to the WGAN.
To evaluate the performance of PPGAN, we compare three solutions, namely dp-GAN [6], DPGAN [3] and WGAN
[20] (Non-private Case) in terms of the quality of the generated data.
As can be seen from Fig. 5, the data quality generated by PPGAN is better than dp-GAN and DPGAN.
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Figure 5: Generate scores of generative data on model PPGAN, DPGAN and dp-GAN. (δ = 1.0× 10−5)
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the PPGAN model that preserves the privacy of training data in a differentially private case.
PPGAN mitigates information leakage by adding well-designed noise to the gradient during the learning process. We
conducted two experiments to show that the proposed algorithm can converge under the noise and constraints of the
training data and generate high-quality data. Also, our experimental results verify that PPGAN does not suffer from
mode collapse or gradient disappearance during training, thus maintaining excellent stability and scalability of model
training.
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